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How I became a qualitative researcher?
Abstract: The present article presents the personal experience of the author with research methodolo-
gies. Some limits of the social scientific research are being analyzed, regarding two of the stages of research: 
theoretical framework and operationalization; this is the way in which the validity of the criteria and the 
construct validity came into discussion. At the same time, the character of sociological theories and their 
utility in scientific research are under discussion. Reasons for which qualitative is chosen are listed despite 
the constant disapproval of this method in Romanian sociology (and it’s marginalization in Central – East 
Europe). The advantages of qualitative research in socio-human sciences are presented (what is being re-
searched, through what methods, with what results). The special case of using the focus-group at a large scale 
is being analyzed (its use without following two of the major qualitative principals: theoretical sampling 
and theoretical saturation). The article advocates for the usage of qualitative and it is written in a personal 
and provocative style. 
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My goal in this article is to show the impact 
that the contact and later on the experience with 
social research methodologies has on the person 
learning and using them. I will illustrate this by 
the example of my personal experience. I will 
show how I became a qualitative researcher and 
I will be pleading for getting qualitative out of 
the anonymity it finds itself in Central – East 
Europe.
I. Introduction
The research methodology is one of the most 
important disciplines in any college syllabus that 
trains future sociologists (together with subjects 
that are aimed at learning the sociological 
theories and statistical procedures). It is being 
studied during a period of at least a year and it 
prepares the students for the best known (and 
the most recognized) competence of sociolo-
gists: the research competence.
To begin with, a small observation: the us-
age of the terms qualitative and quantitative has 
been established (in the international literature 
also) in naming research methodologies. There 
are some authors that have proved the improper 
usage of these terms, proposing (eventually) the 
use of the terms non-scientific and scientific 
(see Onuţ, 2009 and Rotariu 2009). I tend to 
agree with them and in this article I will be us-
ing the expressions scientific and unscientific. 
However, in the first pages I have kept to the 
traditional terms in order to make clear what I 
am referring to.
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In training the majority of sociology 
students in Romania the research methodol-
ogy equals with learning quantitative research 
methods and techniques (with one noticeable 
exception – focus-group, as a qualitative inter-
viewing technique; I will return to that later 
in this article). The qualitative method is not 
recognized (in Romania) as the provider of new 
knowledge; it is at best recognized for its artistic 
and literary valence; it is also excluded from the 
analytical programs because of a declared fear 
that students who find statistics too complicated 
might have a reason for not learning it (of 
course, the list of reasons is longer – the longest 
and most elaborate is that of professor Onuţ).
I have reasons to believe that the situation 
is similar in the majority of the Central and 
East European countries (considering, for 
example, the number of articles coming from 
these countries that deal with subjects related 
to qualitative research). In these countries, as in 
Romania, qualitative is, in most cases, given the 
same status as the use of focus-group, especially 
in marketing research. 
In this article, I will try to show that there are 
a lot of arguments undermining the dominant 
position which the quantitative research occu-
pies in Romanian sociology (and also in that of 
Central and East Europe); that the qualitative 
research methodology produces knowledge 
which is worth taking into consideration. I will 
not mention as argument (except in this intro-
duction) the fact that the qualitative methodol-
ogy has been used worldwide for decades, that 
it is a legitimate approach, frequently used and 
with very little controversy. Also, I will not men-
tion the extremely numerous books and articles 
that deal with subjects of qualitative methodol-
ogy in the United States, Canada, West Europe, 
the numerous qualitative researches that are be-
ing performed there at this moment, renowned 
journals that publish exclusively articles dealing 
with the qualitative methodology, specific pro-
fessional associations, etc. 
Of course, in Romania, for example, sociol-
ogy had a troubled history. Between 1978 and 
1990, universities were not allowed to produce 
sociologists; sociology resumed its legitimacy 
only in the 1990. We may suppose it normal 
that the interest for qualitative developed with a 
corresponding delay (the first book written by a 
Romanian sociologist that dealt with qualitative 
research appeared in 1997 (see Iluţ), after the 
qualitative began to take shape internationally at 
the beginning of the 20th century, witnessing an 
explosion in the 1960s and 1970s). What is not 
normal is the fact that since then the qualitative 
research has been so hardly tolerated, so much 
discredited. 
Not long ago, at a sociological conference, 
I was presented to some other professors and 
sociologists, and, after a series of praises, I was 
qualified like this: “she has only one flaw, she is 
a qualitative researcher”. You become open of 
reproof, at least in Romania, when you publicly 
declare that you are an advocate of the qualita-
tive methodology. I will describe in detail my 
experience with social research methodologies 
and the way I became a qualitative researcher.
II. How I discovered the social  
research methodologies?
I was admitted to the University of Brasov, 
the Faculty of Sociology in 1996. Our profes-
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sor of “Sociological research methods and 
techniques” was Mr. Gheorghe Onuţ. It goes 
without saying, we were studying the quantita-
tive research methodology, and our compulsory 
literature included, among others, the books 
of Romanian professors: Chelcea (1975), 
Mărginean (1982), Miftode (1995), Rotariu 
and Iluţ (1997), Vlăsceanu (1986) and of pro-
fessors: Ackroid and Hughes (1992), Festinger 
and Katz (1963), Javeau (1992). Anyone who 
knows professor Onuţ can easily imagine that 
along with my colleagues, I could not get 
anything else but a follower of the quantitative 
rigor (which I was feeling, preaching, respecting, 
using, thoroughly studying, etc). 
The exam task for this class was to choose a 
book on methodology (from a rather long list) 
to discuss (we had to choose an idea, a term, a 
chapter, etc. which we had to present, criticize, 
analyze, etc.). Professor Iluţ’s book – “The 
qualitative approach of the socio-human”  – 
had recently appeared on the market and it 
was on the list. As I was reading it I knew that 
that was going to be the book I will present at 
the exam. I read passionately and every new 
idea discovered about qualitative methodology 
revolted me.
It was the first time I got to know something 
about the qualitative research and it seemed 
awful that such a thing existed at all and that it 
could be appreciated as science. I still have the 
notes with the ideas I presented at the exam, 
and here are some extracts.
So, I want to comment on the term “qualita-
tive”. Involvement in a qualitative approach of 
the socio-human would imply, as I discovered in 
professor’s Iluţ book: 
– that sometimes you might not have an effec-
tive problem to study: “Sometimes not even the 
problems are preliminary presented, they are to 
be discovered and defined through such discus-
sions [discussions which are absolutely y free with 
members of the aimed community]” 
(Iluţ 1997; 90) and “In the qualitative vision, 
the most helpful indication that can be given to 
someone taking up research work is ‘go in the field, 
start working and you will see’” (p. 111)
– that the researcher will not undertake any 
preconceived documentation: “qualitative re-
searchers do not speak about a preliminary phase 
of documentation regarding the place and the 
population selected” (p. 82), will not develop 
hypotheses: “the theory (concepts, descriptive-
explanatory schemes, the assumptions) is born 
in the living process of the research and from the 
direct contact with the field – the thesis so dear 
to the qualitative researchers” (p. 32).
And I was commenting on these amazing 
discoveries: putting myself in the shoes of the 
researcher that engages in this kind of approach 
I cannot help wondering what I am researching, 
what I am to have in sight, what I have to ignore, 
which is the purpose of the research???
The findings continued: sampling should be 
theoretical, and the selection of the study cases will 
be a problem of flair and intuition. The questions 
also continued: how much confidence can you 
have in flair and intuition? What confidence can 
you have in the results of a research performed by 
a person’s flair and intuition? How representative 
are the results of a research based on theoretical 
sampling?
The results of such a research (I made those 
propositions in my second year in the college) 
can only be more or less subjective descriptions of 
some particular cases, phenomena or processes. 
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But “the ambition of some qualitative researchers 
is to do more than just simple descriptions and 
classifications, aiming towards theorizing and 
articulated theories. The analytical induction 
process is brought into discussion” (p. 55). Allow 
me (I asked, almost like a Caragiale’s character, 
in the exam room) to doubt the fact that articu-
lated and valid theories can be achieved through 
analytical induction!
I then discovered that selectivity plays a 
crucial role in the qualitative research (professor 
Iluţ remarks in his field notes: “to note carefully 
should not be confused with recording everything or 
anything” (p. 82)). And I commented: without 
a previous plan, some hypothesis and a problem 
to solve, the selectivity required to the researcher 
can only be subjective. It is impossible to demand 
from a person, may he or she be a researcher, 
objectivity, especially in the case of participatory 
observation. His or her work cannot even be clas-
sified as descriptions but as impressions. What kind 
of scientific value can these impressions have (even 
when coming from scientists)?
I then discovered that the elaboration of a 
research report should be artistic and not scientific 
(any kind of expression is allowed, the use of stylistic 
means is encouraged). From this moment on, my 
contempt for qualitative approach was expressed 
rather eloquently: 
The great concern of qualitative researchers is 
the form of the presentation and not the content. 
Except for the (maybe) indisputable literary value 
that this type of presentation of the research 
report may have, I have doubts about the scien-
tific value, the new and valid knowledge that the 
research may bring. The purpose of the qualitative 
approach of the socio-human study is to enrich 
literature, isn’t it? 
The only conclusion of this analysis of in the 
qualitative approach can only be that this ap-
proach is not only useless but it is also dangerous 
(the presentation of the results of this kind of 
research as scientific data). 
I try to impose myself that naming this ap-
proach “qualitative” does not come as a conse-
quence of considering the current meaning of the 
term. On the other hand, I cannot stop thinking of 
something of value when I hear the term “qualita-
tive approach”. But what can be of value in this 
type of research?
I concluded with a citation from professor 
Iluţ’s book. He proposed that in socio-human 
studies an overlapping of “the wise quantita-
tive with the rigorous qualitative should exist” 
(p. 171). In my opinion, I stated then, qualitative 
has no rigorism in it. The vagueness, the lack of 
clarity, the confusion and subjectivism has nothing 
to do with rigorism. Therefore, the phrase rigorous 
qualitative is, for me, something of grammatical 
lapse.
This was my first encounter with the qualita-
tive research ( I passed the exam, of course, with 
a 10). This attitude towards it firmly established 
for many years after that. After graduating the 
college I remained in the faculty as a junior 
assistant. After a few years I became professor 
Onuţ’s assistant and during the methodology 
seminars I explained the students how well the 
quantitative method works. 
Certainly, the majority of sociologists from 
Romania (and probably a big part of those in 
the Central and Eastern Europe) would consider 
my observations and assessments regarding the 
qualitative research substantiated. I wanted to 
show that many of its shortcomings were per-
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ceived even by myself at a certain point in time. 
I am aware of this negative attitude towards 
the qualitative approach because I had it once 
myself; and I am familiar with the criticism of 
this type of research, no matter how cutting it is.
III. Reasons for blaming sociological 
scientific research methodology
Professor Onuţ was my teacher not only 
during my college years, but also during the 
period I was his assistant. I learned a lot of things 
from him; I adopted a great deal of his ideas and 
dilemmas (without realizing that perhaps I am 
treating some of them as my own). I have to say 
that the good ideas present in this article might 
be his and the inaccuracies are exclusively mine.
During the research methodology seminars, 
trying to show the students how a scientific 
research is done I started to discover more and 
more complicated problems, aggravating the im-
plementation of methodological requirements.
I will mention just a couple of major dif-
ficulties that signalled me the sociological 
scientific research is not what it seems to be. 
These difficulties gradually made me distance 
myself from the quantitative research. I got to 
the point I could not teach the students this type 
of research because I did not believe in it any-
more (in the objectivity it demands, in its strict, 
controlled procedures, in its assumed validity). I 
was ashamed to present as scientific something 
that was not, to push implausible claims, to ask 
students to do what could not be done.
I do not deny that sociological scientific 
research has made sensational progress. It re-
sulted in numerous objective gains for science 
(for example, some measurement scales, prob-
ability sampling, statistic representativeness, sets 
of statistical tests of significance, sets of rules 
for avoiding general and specific measurement 
errors, etc.). But there are many other problems 
that have remained unsolved and hidden under 
the rug while trying to make a social science 
something which it will never be – a natural 
science. I will come back to this idea later in 
the article.
Here are some questions regarding the quan-
titative research methodology to which I could 
not find satisfactory answers and which have 
seriously shaken my methodological conviction.
The theoretical framework is of principle 
importance in most social science research 
methodology textbooks. But there is one thing 
I cannot understand from any of them, namely, 
the way this framing is brought about. How can 
I teach others if I cannot understand it myself? 
For a hypothesis to be tested it must have op-
erationally defined terms in the theories. For 
example, I cannot show that beautiful women 
are also intelligent until I have an operational 
definition for beauty and one for intelligence. 
In a scientific research we are to choose a theory 
in which we have to define the term beauty 
operationally. We should do the same with the 
term intelligence. There are theories stating that 
a beautiful woman is the one who is closest to 
the 90–60–90 figure standard, or other theories 
saying that beauty lays in the symmetry of the 
features. In the first case we have to measure 
the bust, waist and the hips of the women 
in the sample and then compare the results 
with the standards. This is the way in which 
we decide if they are beautiful. In the second 
case, we measure the length of their legs and 
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then compare results, we measure the length 
of both arms and compare the results, and we 
measure the distance between the left eye and 
the nose, then the distance between the right 
eye and the nose, and so on. The women with 
the closest results to each of the measurements 
will be declared beautiful. Without a theory 
we cannot decide objectively and legitimate if 
a woman is beautiful or not.
The theoretical framework problem lies 
in choosing the reference theory for a specific 
research. In sociology there are several theories 
that describe or explain the same phenomena. 
There are many theories of the concept of 
power, theories of elites, theories of deviance, 
of confidence, of conflict, of revolution, of 
suicide, of identity, etc. I think it’s rather odd 
we do not have more theories on one and the 
same phenomena.
In exact sciences it is otherwise. Can we 
imagine a type of mathematics where 2+2 does 
not always add up to 4 but sometimes 1 or 5? 
Can we imagine a world in which the theory 
that the Earth is flat coexists with the theory that 
the Earth is round? The problem with social sci-
ence is not the existence of more theories of the 
same phenomenon, it goes to the fact that those 
theories coexist on an equal footing. Suicide is 
a phenomenon linked to mental disorders, but 
suicide is also a phenomenon linked to the level 
of social cohesion of a specific society. Deviance 
is the result of society failure trying to master 
and control human passions (the theory of 
social control), it is the result of the pressure 
of legitimate wishes that are encouraged, even 
prescribed by society, but remain unsatisfied 
because of the lack of means (the theory of social 
contradiction), it is the result of interiorizing 
the group norms (the cultural theory), and it is 
also the consequence of the reactions of people 
to somebody’s action (you are deviant if others 
recognize you as one), not a property of that 
action (interactionist theory).
More significant than the fact that there are 
more theories on the same phenomenon, more 
significant than the fact that these theories are 
equally valid and legitimate is the fact that there 
exist contradicting theories about one and the 
same phenomenon. How do we choose the 
reference theory from all of these?
Before discussing the problem of choice, 
other practical problems intervene: How do we 
know if we have taken into consideration all the 
existing theories or which are worth to be taken 
into consideration for our study? How do we 
know where to stop the search for new interpre-
tations of the phenomenon under study? Any 
attempt to reunite all the socio-human theories 
in an encyclopaedia seems too far-fetched. And 
even if we managed to put together an inven-
tory of those existent by the present moment, 
it would be outdated tomorrow. We pick the 
theory from the multitude of theories in front 
of us, according to the size of the library which 
we have access to and to our diligence and to 
the time aloted for reading. Aren’t there too 
many intervening subjective  factors that have 
nothing to do with science?
But what does theoretical framework actu-
ally mean? Professor Vlăsceanu speaks about 
“referential theory”. Given the research prob-
lem, we rummage among the existing theories 
for the theory that will become referential for 
our scientific work. As referential theories may 
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serve those theories through which we can 
“read” the problem to be researched (those that 
refer to the identified problem or to elements 
connected to it, which propose an approach, 
which reflect conceptually the investigated 
reality). The object of knowledge can this way 
be seen through the “eyes” of the theory: “the 
researcher relates to the real object from the 
perspective of his theory of reference, consider-
ing it as the object of knowledge” (1982; 230).
The sociology textbooks suggest (at the 
theoretical framework stage) choosing the most 
“appropriate” theory as a reference for our study; 
choosing the best theory that will supply the 
most “adequate” operational definitions for 
measuring.
Supposing we are diligent, and we have a 
large library and a lot of time at our disposal, 
and we have made a huge inventory of theories 
for us – how do we actually make our choice in 
the end? Do we choose the simplest, the pret-
tiest, the best known, the most used theory? 
The one which supplies the “most operational” 
definition of terms? Can a choice made like this 
be objective?
Of course, not. The choice is arbitrary or 
value-laden. Kuhn shows that “what highlights 
a careful study of scientific life reality, is that the 
views of which are compared competing theo-
ries do not work as methodological rules that 
could determine unequivocally a certain choice, 
but as values  that influence it” (1999; 44).
The validity with which a scientific research 
praises is the criterion validity. Of course, the 
social scientific researchers do not make a lot 
of fuss about it (especially because it might 
put them in difficulty). It shows if the research 
is well grounded in theory, if we have chosen 
the operational definitions that best reflect the 
studied phenomena. How can the researcher ac-
count for the validity of the criterion measure of 
the chosen theory? He cannot, and he does not!
The researcher has chosen the theory he 
likes best, he knows best, the one he can find 
easily and the theory that is easier to use, etc. If 
we do not choose objectively, following precise 
methodological criteria, can what we produce 
be qualified as scientific?
Another important stage in a sociological 
scientific research is sociological operation-
alization. Variables to be measured from the 
hypothesis must be operationalized (those that 
are abstract and cannot be measured directly). 
The operationalizations must be deductive 
(extracted from theories) and not inductive (ex-
tracted from the researchers experience or from 
information collected by others). Professors 
Rotariu and Iluţ (1997; 180) argue, rightly, that 
“in the absence of a clear theory, an analysis, no 
matter how thorough it might be, cannot guar-
antee the identification of all the dimensions of 
a concept”. As long as you do not operationalize 
the measuring concepts in theories, you cannot 
justify objectively why you chose to measure this 
indicator and not another, why one dimension 
is missing in the operationalization and why 
another one appears, etc. 
But are the sociological theories a source 
of operational definitions? How many theories 
can give us dimensions and especially indicators 
(meaning directly measurable entities) for the 
concepts they convey? Let’s suppose that these 
are enough, that we have enough choice and 
that we found in them not only dimensions 
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and indicators, but also information about the 
weight of any of them in the economy of the 
variable to be measured.
In sociology we work pretty often with 
complex variables, which cannot be measured 
directly, for example, religiosity, anomie, au-
tonomy, domination or even “just” consumer 
attitude or behavior. What does the operation-
alization of these concepts contain? How many 
dimensions, how many indicators? Would it be 
a surprise to find thousands of them? Can we 
measure everything in a research? Of course, we 
cannot! It is here  where we make a selection of 
variables and indicators. Sometimes I wonder 
when someone comes up with an exhaustive op-
erational definition, but I especially wonder how 
researchers reach the effective operational defi-
nitions (on which they make the measurement 
instruments). How do they make the selection 
of dimensions and indicators? They choose the 
most “representative” for the measurement! But 
on what criteria do they choose some of them as 
being more representative, on what criteria they 
eliminate the others as “non-representative”?
I believe that sociologists – scientific re-
searchers do not even get to the point of having 
problems regarding this choice because their 
measurements are not based on exhaustive 
operational definition. Actually, I believe that 
the majority of them do not even work with 
deductive operationalizations.
In these conditions, how many of the 
measurements are needed to prove the con-
struct validity (I chose the most representative 
indicators to measure what I have to measure)? 
It cannot be proven and researchers do not 
even try because the choice of indicators to be 
measured is arbitrary or value-laden! 
The researcher probably chose the dimen-
sions that came with the indicators or the 
dimensions for which the indicators were easier 
to “guess” or the most common dimensions. 
But is the result scientific if it is obtained from 
the subjective choice of what is to be measured?
Content validity is most often invoked by 
social scientific researchers. This may be because 
it is the most “visible” and easy to impute. Many 
efforts have been concentrated on it and a lot of 
studies take pride in really measuring what they 
have to measure and not something else. Still, 
the question remains whether the fact that you 
are measuring what you want to measure has 
any value as long as you cannot justify objec-
tively the choice of what you want to measure 
(i.e. the terms of the theory – chosen how?, the 
dimensions and indicators of the concepts – 
chosen how?).
I became more and more unsatisfied because 
of so many questions without a reasonable an-
swer and they continued to bother me regarding 
the quantitative research. This is the context in 
which I came across some dusty books in the 
library: Denzin (1998a, b), Flick (1998), Strauss 
and Corbin (1990). And during a summer 
month I devoured every single word from those 
books. I felt like I was reading really good nov-
els. It seemed natural to look at people, at their 
actions, at their words as the authors suggested. 
IV. Why do I believe more in the  
non-scientific sociological research?
In 2006 I wrote a “Handbook of qualitative 
research in socio-human sciences”. I was eager 
to share with the students what I had discovered 
and what I had understood from the books I 
mentioned earlier.
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In this book I wrote that “being newer, the 
socio-human “sciences” were obliged, in order 
to be recognized, to adopt the scientificity 
criteria that were used till then in the evalua-
tion of natural sciences. Therefore, they were 
looking for the “positive” knowledge based 
on systematic observation and experiment. 
They had to describe and explain objectively, 
through measurable results, the phenomena 
related to individuals and society. These claims 
have been assiduously pursued for many years 
and by many researchers” (p. 10).
I sincerely believed (and I still do) that being 
stubborn about reaching the positivist standards 
and not taking into consideration the specific 
and distinctive character of the socio-human 
sciences can only bring damage to them.
And I made use of a figure of speech. “Lying 
in a bush and prowling for a deer, the man puts 
some words together; he forces them to work 
together and sound pleasingly. He composes 
something that will be named as poem. Other 
men, in moments of boredom or inspiration, 
do the same. They become great poets. They 
are poets. They invented and realized it in ac-
cordance with their mind, structure and pos-
sibilities. Women, rather than waiting calmly 
for the inspiration that would have led them 
to compose a new “wonder”, made to fit their 
mind, structure and possibilities, they struggled 
restlessly to make “poetry”. No matter how 
hardworking or inspired, they will never be men 
and they will never compose “poems”. This not 
only qualifies them as helpless, because they 
cannot create something similar, but they are 
also “guilty” because they robbed the human 
race of the pleasure of enjoying non-invented 
“wonders”. The natural sciences are men, the 
socio-human sciences are women. The poem 
is the positivism, and its wonder waits to be 
discovered” (p. 11).
The qualitative research seems to keep in 
mind the fact that the purpose of the socio-
human science research is different than the 
purpose of the natural science research. So, the 
discussion is about knowing something else 
and through other means. In conclusion, the 
evaluation of this knowledge can only be made 
by other, than the positivist, criteria. 
“If the qualitative research is evaluated using 
the positivist criteria, than it and its results can-
not be “scientific”. But an evaluation using these 
criteria cannot be made; it is not appropriate. 
The qualitative research suggests a different type 
of knowledge (of a different nature). One thing 
is to aspire to discover some laws, to generalize 
some data (knowledge evaluated by “conven-
tional” criteria) and it is something different 
to strive to discover profound information, 
to get to understand (knowledge evaluated by 
“naturalistic” criteria)” (p. 12).
Even though the evaluation criteria for the 
qualitative research are weak and even if it does 
look nothing like a scientific research, it is fair 
to recognize your limits (to show how much 
you can obtain), rather than trying to hide your 
weaknesses (claiming you have obtained what 
cannot be obtained).
Therefore, I consider that the scientific re-
search, as it is applied in natural sciences, is not 
appropriate for the study of people. The subjects 
of the research here are not substances, plants, 
numbers or electric circuits; they are people and 
they talk, they can lie, they can dissimulate, 
 267
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2012/1(30), ISSN 1392-3358 Kokybinių tyrimų metodologija
they can change their attitudes, behavior or 
statements according to social desirability, they 
defend their reputation, they take care of their 
image, etc. The research situations in socio-
human sciences do not excel when it comes to 
control; the studied phenomena are rarely (so I 
do not say never) exactly repeatable, etc.
Proposing a new research methodology in 
the socio-human sciences brings to discussion 
a new principle – that of the plurality of the 
scientific methodology and it presupposes the 
independence of socio-human sciences from 
natural sciences.
And even if we do not call it science, and 
even if we do not call it research, and even if 
we do not call it qualitative, we cannot deny 
the fact that this something exists and that this 
something, or maybe a better something, is 
needed in social sciences.
Qualitative research is being carried out in 
the natural environment of the studied phe-
nomenon or in the natural environment of the 
subjects, it does not create artificial situations, 
it does not provoke events, it does not bring 
its subjects in labs. The researcher, more than 
the operators, finds himself in the field observ-
ing, interviewing, etc., he treats his subjects as 
equals, he understands them, he suffers and he is 
happy with them if needed, he is not a stranger 
for them and he does not treat them as such, he 
lets them talk, he respects their points of view, 
he does not any second pretend he knows better 
what is going on with them, what they think 
or feel, how and why they do what they do. He 
pays attention especially to the complex and 
deep ideas and feelings; he looks for information 
about the way they think, what they appreciate, 
how people interpret different things, not only 
what they say they vote, consume, buy, etc.
Qualitative research involves a great opening 
towards the field, it favours the point of view of 
the subjects, trying to describe and explain the 
studied phenomena without preconceptions, 
unlike the scientific research which elaborates 
a priori hypothetical propositions (putting 
in foreground the researcher’s point of view), 
which later build up the situation and verifica-
tion tools to conclude, in most cases, that the 
hypothesis is confirmed (it always seems amaz-
ing to me how rarely the hypothesis is refuted, 
and it does not come as a surprise that many 
beginning researchers think that if the hypoth-
esis is refuted the research has failed).
The image obtained as a result of qualita-
tive studies is a process, capturing details (like 
a movie which lets you get inside the subjects 
mind, in their homes, etc.) unlike the one ob-
tained from the scientific studies which is static, 
dealing with the exterior of the subjects (like 
pictures that capture only surface information). 
The qualitative researcher, unlike the scientific 
one, is aware and recognizes the fact that the 
social research implies the subjectivity of the 
researcher and that it cannot be free of values, 
that it can be fundamentally affected by errors 
generated also by these evidences.
A renowned Romanian historian wrote 
about historians something which I think is 
true also for sociologists: “if you look up in 
the dictionary, you will find that “objective” is 
“something that exists outside the conscience”, 
so, logically, can only be applied to the study of 
objects, things, inert matter. The historian deals 
first of all with humans – individuals or com-
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munities, therefore subjects are not objects, and 
in order to understand these subjects he must 
be subjective” (Djuvara 2010; 6).
In my opinion, the sophisticated statistical 
machine (worthy of all respect) has pushed us 
further away from the social knowledge (as it 
is supposed to be). What percentage of the 
variables we measure are numerical or continue? 
Why do we need accurate statistical procedures 
if we can use them only in exceptional cases? 
Doesn’t the description in percent, on graphics 
of human realities simplify a little bit too much 
their complexity? Are we not trying to mould 
statistically and mathematically interpretations, 
feelings, representations?
Professor Rotariu somehow confessed at 
a conference (I hope I am not distorting the 
meaning of his words): I never succeeded in 
trying to confirm explicative models in actual 
life, this is just not possible; human phenomena 
do not follow explicative models which you can 
confirm statistically.
And if it cannot be done, why do we still 
bother? Would it not be more productive to 
focus our efforts on promises rather than on 
impossibilities?
I am sure that 1000 quantitative studies, 
1000 statistics or cold and dry graphics say less 
than one qualitative study. The results of qualita-
tive research are extremely suggestive and this 
increases greatly their applicability.
Here are some examples of the projects 
of qualitative research done, under my coor-
dination, by the students from Social Work 
Department each year (they help make the 
voice of some forgotten, marginalized and even 
discriminated subjects heard). Cancer patients 
who talk about the way they handle the disease, 
about what keeps them alive, what bothers them 
at the people they interact with and about the 
shock they have when they look in the mirror 
and discover they do not have eyelashes or 
eyebrows anymore; women molested by their 
husbands, who talk about shame, about their 
mothers who taught them they were to endure; 
gipsy children who relate about their first days 
of school, about the fact that, at the age of 7, 
they discover that “water can come out of the 
wall”. The help given to these people can be, as 
a consequence of this kind of study, 1000 times 
more efficient.
Post-modern sociology set itself apart from 
the model of the science that produces laws, 
absolute truths; it became contextual; the 
great theories faded in front of the local ones. 
This situation stimulates the application of the 
qualitative research methodologies. We can call 
it non-scientific, and it seems likewise, but it is 
also more adequate to the human realities and 
to the contemporary characteristics of their 
studies.
Even if we stick to the big theories, how 
were they developed? How “scientific” are 
Marx’s or Webber’s theories? Babbie (2010; 461) 
lists them within the comparative-historical 
research, which he calls “typical qualitative”.
I do not believe that there is a sociologist 
who disregards the works of Goffman, Bour-
dieu, Baudrillard, Bauman, etc. We consider 
them great theoreticians of the field; we in-
terpret different life or professional contexts 
using their theories. Does anybody laugh at 
their theories? Does anybody consider them 
literature or any other form of art? Is it not 
 269
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2012/1(30), ISSN 1392-3358 Kokybinių tyrimų metodologija
knowledge what they made (if they have not 
applied experiments, surveys on representative 
populations, etc.)?
In 2007, Goffman was the sixth most 
quoted author in social and humanistic sciences. 
What about his method? Was it not qualitative 
research? Among other things, he did an exten-
sive observation that lasted a year, in a mental 
hospital (posing as an employee) describing the 
world of the patients; he interpreted the life of 
the people as a drama representation (describing 
the actors, the stage, the audience, the costumes, 
etc., as they appear in day to day life).
Is there a more metaphoric and at the same 
time  meaningfull discourse (which hits you 
like a lightning once you discover it) than that 
of Baudrillard? And is his writing fiction? Does 
the metaphor of the obese or that of the obscene 
have another value besides the stylistic one? Do 
not concepts like habitus (Bourdieu) or practical 
consciousness (Giddens) have an extraordinary 
explicatory power for human behavior, attitude, 
etc., but are completely un-operational at the 
same time?
I stated in an earlier paragraph that the 
sociological theories are very far from the 
situation in which they could give operational 
terms in order to facilitate and legitimate the 
measuring. Among the shortcomings of social 
theory, Blumer (1964) mentions the fact that: 
„social theory is conspicuously defective in its 
guidance of research inquiry. It is rarely couched 
in such form as to facilitate or allow directed 
investigation to see whether it or its implica-
tions are true”.
The concepts, the author goes on to say, 
have a vague meaning and they lack a precise 
specification of attributes: „it should be evident 
that concepts in social theory are distressingly 
vague. Representative terms like mores, social 
institutions, attitudes, social class, value, cul-
tural norm, personality, reference group, social 
structure, primary group, social process, social 
system, urbanization, accommodation, differ-
ential discrimination and social control do not 
discriminate cleanly their empirical instances”.
I think we can agree with Blumer that the 
majority of the concepts in social theories are 
“sensitizing concepts”: „A sensitizing concept 
lacks such specification of attributes or bench 
marks and consequently it does not enable the 
user to move directly to the instance and its rel-
evant content. Instead, it gives the user a general 
sense of reference and guidance in approaching 
empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts 
provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing 
concepts merely suggest directions along which 
to look. The hundreds of our concepts—like 
culture, institutions, social structure, mores, 
and personality—are not definitive concepts 
but are sensitizing in nature. They lack precise 
reference and have no bench marks which allow 
a clean-cut identification of a specific instance 
and of its content. Instead, they rest on a general 
sense of what is relevant”.
The author thinks that these characteristics 
of the sociological concepts are not caused by 
the immaturity of social science but by the na-
ture of the empirical world that we study. The 
need for a qualitative approach of the social (I 
add) is given by this nature and I also sustain 
what Blumer says: “what we are referring to by 
any given concept shapes up in a different way 
in each empirical instance”. Qualitative research 
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uses these concepts (where their imprecision 
and their lack of clarity brings full benefits) as 
follows: „Socio-psychological concepts such 
as family, victim, stress, stigma, and so on are 
defined in a loosened manner at the beginning 
of the study; they are not given operational 
definitions so that the researcher could explore 
the way in which the concept manifests and 
how it is given a particular meaning in the set 
of circumstances which are being investigated” 
(Schwandt 2007; 274).
Here is an example: one of the things I did 
for my PhD program was the conceptualization 
of the identity of managers in Romania. I started 
from the very loose definition of identity given 
by Gadrey (1998). He defines identity as a set of 
circumstances which make a person that specific 
person. And analysing the interviews I had with 
the managers I discovered the circumstances 
that made them managers (relational, material 
or professional circumstances, circumstances 
linked to childhood, teens or maturity etc.). 
Represented schematically (like an operation-
alization), the identity of the studied managers 
– as a set of circumstances – qualitatively dis-
covered, covers 7 dimensions and 50 indicators.
There are very numerous social research situ-
ations in which the measuring of the variables 
using the scientific methodology is not enough. 
For example, we can measure the voting inten-
tion, but what if we need to understand how 
the voting options are formed? Most of these 
situations are solved by wide admittance and 
usage (even in Romania) of a qualitative group 
interview technique: focus-group.
Even in its structural forms, the focus-group 
is still a non-scientific or qualitative technique. 
Professor Iluţ (1997; 92) affirms that the group 
interview is especially qualitative “also because 
of the fact that here we are not interested pri-
marily in the way people say a thing or another, 
but what people say, how they say it, and how 
what is said comes into being, etc.”.
We cannot say that what we are trying to 
obtain through a focus-group is not knowledge 
(as we cannot say that what we obtain through 
the implementation of other qualitative data 
collection techniques is not knowledge). Of 
course, it is a different kind of data: more 
complex, profound, non-numerical, very hard 
and useless to quantify. But this kind of data is 
not useless. It reveals, for example, the way in 
which political opinions are formed, the way in 
which voting options are aggregated, situations 
and ways in which these opinions change or 
are structured. This is the data on which cam-
paign strategies are based and then elections are 
won. Not to mention the numerous successful 
marketing campaigns that were designed using 
information obtained through focus-groups. 
Why couldn’t the individual qualitative inter-
views produce new knowledge? Why do we 
consider as good the results obtained in 2, 3 
focus-groups but not the data obtained from 
20, 30 individual interviews?
If we “give in” and consider “valid” the 
knowledge produced by focus-groups, why is 
it so hard to accept biographical interviews as 
a source of knowledge (or diaries, or pictures, 
etc.). If we accepted the existence of theoretical 
sampling (and we argue that we use it in achiev-
ing focus-groups) would it not be better to apply 
it “by the book” (by the “qualitative book”)? 
Theoretical sampling does not mean to sample a 
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priori. It does not mean to only suppose (accord-
ing to the objective) it would be better to add 
to the focus-groups workers and intellectuals, 
young people and old people, men and women, 
etc. Theoretical sampling means to discover who 
else you have to interview during the collection 
and analysis of the data. It means to decide who 
enters the sample according to what you find 
out along the way. For example, you find out 
that young people vote as their friends do, but 
with the “less young” people things are more 
complicated. This means you will have to select 
additional “less young” samples (even divided 
on significant subsamples of adults and old – 
according to the analysis) in order to find out 
in detail the way in which they vote.
I heard many scientific researchers say that 
they used in their studies theoretical sampling. 
What actually hides under this name is, in most 
cases, the non-probabilistic sampling (often one 
of its type is accidental sampling). In order not 
to look bad (from a scientific point of view) 
researchers remark that they did a theoretical 
sampling even though what they applied does 
not meet its criteria. 
What kind of people we bring in a focus-
group still seems to be a problem which is being 
handled (wrong). But it is a bigger one for the 
scientific researchers who try to solve problems 
through non-scientific methods. How many 
focus-groups do we need to form? Two, three, 
answer the eager ones. Anyway, it should be 
more than one… Actually, the analysis of the 
data is what precisely indicates how many we 
need. It is a condition which was missing in 
the qualitative model: achieving theoretical 
saturation. If we form a focus-group with young 
people, one with adults and another with old 
people it does not mean that we already have 
three group interviews and that it is enough. 
Normally, we should form another focus group 
with each of these categories. And then ana-
lyze the data. If the second focus-group with 
the young people brings us new information 
about the way in which they form their voting 
intention it means we did not reach theoretical 
saturation. And this also means we will need a 
third group interview with other young people. 
And if the third one brings us new informa-
tion, we do another one and so on. We should 
proceed like this with the other categories too. 
I consider the incorrect and incomplete 
assumption of the qualitative procedures to be 
dangerous. If we have to accept them as neces-
sary, at least let’s use them honestly; let’s (re)
know and respect their principles.
Therefore, in lack of something better, 
qualitative research at least takes into con-
sideration the fact that we study people and 
human entities; it gives really good, complex, 
profound, meaningfull results, with much 
more sense, with an amazing suggestive power, 
results which deal more with feelings, thoughts, 
attitude, with people in general; it works better 
with the post-modern sociological approaches, 
it uses more the sociological concepts and in a 
more productive way (considering their char-
acteristics); it has proven to be very useful (see 
the use of focus-groups) and it is necessary to 
understand it in order to use it correctly. 
V. “Once I was a positivist”
I never had the impression that my experi-
ence with research methodology was different 
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from that of the others; actually I felt the tran-
sition from positivist to being sensitized and 
impressed by the comprehensive was something 
normal, established a priori. Still I had a won-
derful experience when I discovered Bertaux’s 
(1981) study which started with the phrase: 
“Once I was a positivist”. Of course it would 
be a bold claim on my behalf to say I identify 
myself with the French sociologist (under whose 
name was written: Centre National de la Recher-
che Scientifique, Paris) but his formation makes 
me think I am on the right track too.
Undoubtedly, Bertaux knows what science 
means. He took math, physics, electronics 
classes; his first degree was that of engineer; he 
worked in the field of artificial intelligence and 
military engineering, and as he says: “I thought 
sociology could become a true science, and I 
was eager to make it more scientific” (p. 29). 
He did mobility studies and he was recognized 
as a specialist in processing statistical data.
Bertaux confesses that he realized „that the 
scientificity of sociology is a myth. If there is 
such a thing as sociological knowledge, the way 
to reach it is not through quantitative meth-
odology. And the main obstacle towards it is 
precisely the belief in sociology as a science” 
(p. 30).
I will try to sum up this article by presenting 
the French sociologist’s ideas from his study.
Even if sociology cannot become a science 
(as physics, biology and others), it does not 
mean that social knowledge does not exist. 
„Neither sociology nor economics, history or 
anthropology will ever become sciences like 
the natural sciences. Social life is made out of 
struggles whose outcomes are unpredictable. 
There are no ‘social laws’ like physical laws, 
that is: eternal, totally accurate, acting upon 
everything in the universe. [...] If social science 
is not possible, it does not mean that social 
knowledge is an illusion” (p. 41).
We can produce new and useful knowl-
edge through interviews and qualitative ob-
servations or through qualitative analysis of 
social documents (exactly as the focus-group 
knowledge is produced). The way in which 
we produce scientific social knowledge now 
does not fit the characteristics of our subjects; 
knowledge obtained like this has major short-
comings.
Through questionnaires, the sociologists – 
the scientific researchers – manage only to stifle 
the voice of the subjects (they reduce the answer 
options; they simplify feelings, thoughts, com-
plex behaviors, etc.). Even though the subjects 
talk and think, sociologists do not listen to 
them and they think for them. Talking about 
the difference between natural and social sci-
ences, Bertaux observes: „the objects sociology 
examines do talk. They even think. And the 
sociologist is only one of them, one among 
many, a human being among human beings. 
So that, in order to talk not as a simple human 
being but as a ‘scientist’, he has no other way 
than first to reduce them to silence. If given a 
chance to talk freely, people appear to know a lot 
about what is going on; a lot more, sometimes, 
than sociologists” (p. 38).
This way of producing science, the way in 
which the results of knowledge are presented 
has distanced the beneficiary of knowledge 
from sociology: „sociology is not much read 
these days. And this is a paradox. If sociology 
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were a specialized science like, say, biochemistry 
or electronics, one could understand that none 
except specialists would read about it in spe-
cialized publications. But sociology is not that. 
Its contention is that it deals with institutions, 
cultures, forms of social life, social relations, 
in other words, with the very texture of social 
life as people live it. And yet it seems that these 
very people who should be primarily interested 
to hear what we have to say about their societ-
ies, turn instead towards reading history or 
anthropology, not only because it is ‘dépaysant’ 
(exotic), but also because the discourse of these 
disciplines makes quite often for highly enjoy-
able reading” (p. 32).
So, even if the scientificity of sociology is a 
myth, social knowledge is not an illusion; it is 
necessary to let our subjects talk (as they have 
this ability), it is only normal to do everything 
possible to make sociology be read. I plead to 
make sociology a pleasant discourse to be read 
in Scârneci (2011).
I was once a positivist, too, and I think that 
nothing can take me there again. Even if I am 
aware of the many shortcomings of the quali-
tative aproach, I do not want to make myself 
guilty of ignoring the possibility to discover 
undistorted social world.
VI. Conclusions
I showed in this article what made me set 
apart from the positivistic approach of the 
social, which I think are the major flaws of this 
approach and the dangers it generates; I showed 
what made me get closer to the qualitative ap-
proach and its merits (even if only as a promise).
Qualitative studies are indispensable for 
the discovery of profound social; they should 
be recognized at least because of the important 
value of the hypothesis they generate.
Not recognizing and undermining the 
qualitative approach in Romania (considering 
it as second hand knowledge in Central – East 
Europe) preserves the status of “left behind” 
for our sociology. In 2010 I sent an article to a 
great qualitative research journal in the United 
Kingdom. The reviewers expressed their amaze-
ment regarding my enthusiasm, long gone in 
Western Europe, regarding the discovery of 
qualitative; they were astonished by my pro 
qualitative arguments (there you do not have 
to justify qualitative, it is an accepted approach, 
on equal grounds with positivism). Since then 
I cannot to find my place (I am supposed to 
be old fashioned for Western Europe and in 
Romania I am pushed out of sight).
I wrote this article in a style which I think 
can be called qualitative (I am aware of the 
fact that it is not typical and hard to accept by 
many sociologists – scientists): I was emotion-
ally involved in my writing, I was subjective at 
times, I used the first person, I narrated experi-
ences, I tried to make the reader understand, I 
challenged him.
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SANTRAUKA
KODĖL AŠ PASIRINKAU KOKYBINIO TYRIMO BŪDĄ?
Straipsnis parengtas remiantis asmenišku autorės, dirbančios tyrimo metodologijų srityje, patyrimu. 
Analizuojami sociologinio mokslinio tyrimo trūkumai, susiję su dviem tyrimo pakopomis: teorine struktūra 
ir operacionalizacija. Viena vertus, svarbu kriterijų ir konstrukcijų pagrįstumas, kita vertus, sociologinių 
teorijų taikymo moksliniams tyrimams patikimumas. Aptariamos kokybinio metodo pasirinkimo priežastys 
ir aplinkybės, rodančios, kad šis metodas Rumunijoje ir Centrinėje Rytų Europoje yra marginalizuojamas. 
Svarstomi įvairūs kokybinio metodo privalumai, įskaitant plačios apimties focus-grupių pavyzdžius. Straip-
snio autorė nevengia kokybinio tyrimo būdo apologijos provokacinio stiliaus.
Gauta: 2012 05 12 
Pateikta spaudai: 2012 10 11
Social and Communication Sciences Department, 
“Transilvania” University of Brasov, Romania
Address: B-dul Eroilor, nr. 25, et. II, sala TII9, 
Braşov, România
E-mail: fscarneci@unitbv.ro
